from the UK to enter Europe as a small nation, whilst for the SDLP, it implies breaking from the UK to bring about the gradual reunification of the island of Ireland. This article will use a thick comparative case-study analysis, supplemented by interviews with party members, analysis of government documents, party manifestos and newspapers, to illustrate the different paths that the SNP and SDLP have taken to arrive at a postnationalist interpretation of European integration.
The article is organised in four parts. It begins by exploring the changing relationship between European integration and stateless nationalism since the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. In particular, it explores three principal ways in which Europe has provided certain opportunity structures for substate parties. Following this, the discussion turns to the distinct nature of 'Celtic' nationalism in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The third, substantive section explores how the SNP and SDLP have sought to use European integration to legitimise their projects for constitutional reform. The final section compares the strategies of the SNP and SDLP, in particular highlighting a recent divergence in party responses to an increasingly Eurosceptical electorate.
SNRPs and European Integration
It has been widely argued that the transformation of state and European structures has created new political and economic spaces in which substate actors may operate (Lynch 1996; Keating and McGarry 2001) . European institutions, networks and lobbying organisations have provided an 'opportunity structure' for substate actors, and European integration has opened up new possibilities to pursue territorial interests that were once . Celtic nationalism and supranationalism: comparing Scottish and Northern Ireland responses to Europe'. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(3) , 383-399. 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00426.x 4 'closed' by the expansion of the nation-state (Keating 2004; Bartolini 2005) . As a result of these changes, parties of all ideological creeds, but SNRPs in particular, have become enthused about the possibilities of a regionalised Europe (Elias 2008; Hepburn 2010) .
European integration has affected substate territorial debates in three main ways.
Firstly, European directives and policies impinge directly on devolved competences, thereby creating a number of challenges for regional actors to protect territorial interests from EU encroachment (Hepburn 2010) . For instance, the creation of a Single Market opened up regions to greater economic competition and forced substate regional territories to adapt their industries. In order to make their concerns known, regional actors have challenged the monopoly of national governments by demanding the creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), and establishing regional offices in Brussels to lobby EU institutions (Tatham 2008) . Thus, European integration has encouraged 'bottom-up' regionalism, whereby substate actors have demanded a greater say in European affairs, although this is by no means uniform across territories.
Second, changes in the political structure of state and European institutions have widened the scope for territorial demands. SNRPs are now searching for new forms of autonomy in Europe that are less clear-cut than independent statehood. While territorial political strategies were once focused exclusively on state structures, regional actors now lobby at transnational levels to advance their goals, and European umbrella organisations have been formed to represent regional party interests in European institutions (Lynch 1996) . The European level constitutes a new focus of demands, which have included a 'Europe of the Regions', a 'Europe of the Peoples', a 'Europe of the Small States', and a 'Federal Europe' (Hepburn 2010) . As such, statehood has begun to lose its functional and normative attraction to SNRPs.
Third, European integration has encouraged SNRPs to adopt more civic and inclusive criteria for territorial membership (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Keating 2004 ).
It has become important for SNRPs to develop this new political voice to be perceived as credible and play the European ideological game. These parties are likely to advocate principles and themes common to those of the EU -such as support for free trade and diversity -and a pro-European ideology. However, if a party's demands are not met in Europe, and its rhetoric subsequently becomes more Euro-sceptical, this may indicate that support for European integration is merely tactical, and that there is no long-term attitudinal commitment to European integration.
The main hypothesis of this article is that SNRPs have redefined their goals of autonomy and altered their strategies for obtaining these as a result of the opportunities presented by European integration. These opportunities include access to European institutions such as the CoR and the European Parliament; involvement in European political parties and lobbying organisations; and special rights, funding and minority protections under European law. More specifically, in the case of the devolving UK, we hypothesise that the processes of European integration have caused SNRPs to moderate their demands and advance a postnationalist strategy in an integrating Europe.
Celtic Nationalism
Whilst Scotland and Northern Ireland are only separated by 20 miles of water, there is a dearth of studies comparing political processes in the two territories. residents of Scotland regardless of race or religion (Hepburn 2009b) . This inclusiveness enabled the SNP to rise above various social cleavages (Hamilton 1999: 30) . The SNP has therefore overwhelmingly portrayed itself as a civic nationalist party without any cultural or religious allegiance, and has rejected violence as a means of securing its goals.
The Northern Ireland case is more complex. Firstly, here nationalists do not seek an independent or even autonomous polity, but rather wish to unite with another state which they feel best represents their interests and national identity, the Republic of This neo-functionalism, and the SDLP's generally pro-European outlook, became even more pronounced after John Hume was elected to Strasbourg in June 1979, and then became party leader only a few months later. Even before this, Hume had always been the party's primary ideologue and strategist (Murray 1998: 87) . and it was he who had written the pro-European arguments into SDLP's early policy documents (McLoughlin 2009: 604-5 Ireland (Hume 1993: 229-30) . Accordingly, Hume in particular appeared to embrace something of the 'post-nationalist' discourse that emerged in the early 1990s:
[T]he democratic nation-state is no longer a sufficient political entity to allow people to have adequate control over the economic and technological forces that affect people's opportunities and circumstances. ...
[T]he nation-state is not the last word in polity creation (Hume 1993: 227, 229 ).
In the same vein, like the SNP for a period, the SDLP began to associate itself with the idea of a Europe of Regions (SDLP 1992: 12) . However, again like the SNP, the SDLP was ambiguous on this subject, and failed to clearly define where exactly Northern
Ireland would fit within such a scheme. Accordingly, critics felt that the SDLP was simply advocating the greater regionalisation of Europe as a means to weaken the Union with Britain, and strengthen co-operative links with the Republic of Ireland (McCall 1999: 101, 106 ).
Towards the end of the 1990s, the concept of a Europe of Regions became less prevalent in the SDLP's arguments and policy documents. This appeared to reflect a realisation that the emergence of a more regional dimension to European governance in the early 1990s had been a limited development. Institutions such as the CoR had not evolved in the way that its supporters had hoped for, and decision-making in the EU was still dominated by national governments. Put simply, it became apparent that a Europe of the Regions was not forthcoming. At the same time, the SDLP saw that the British and 
Celtic post-nationalism? Comparing responses to Europe
Despite the considerable differences in their historical backgrounds, there are remarkable similarities between the SNP and the SDLP, the type of nationalism which they articulate, and the way that each party has sought to advance its political agenda in a of SNRPs in 1983. EFA is a relatively loose organisation that allowed members to opt out of some policies, which is important for the SNP as it aims for independent statehood rather than greater regional autonomy unlike most other members (Lynch 1996: 143) .
EFA enabled the SNP to develop closer links with SNRPs from across Europe, and was useful as a mode of 'mutually supportive instrumentalism ' (interview, Neil MacCormick, 28 October 2003) . Meanwhile, the SDLP joined the Party of European Socialists (EPS), and routinely stressed the advantages of alignment with one of the largest and most influential groupings in the Strasbourg assembly. In particular, the party stressed the many economic benefits which Hume, as an influential front-bench member of the EPS, was able to secure for Northern Ireland (SDLP 1984: 1-2, 5-7; 1994: 1; and so a problem which should be resolved by the same means by which a stable peace was achieved in post-war Europe: 'Sovereignty and independence, the issues at the heart of wars in Europe and the issues at the heart of the British-Irish quarrel, have changed their meaning. The basic needs of all countries have led to shared sovereignty and interdependence as we move inevitably to the United States of Europe' (Hume 1993: 229) . Meanwhile, the SNP MEP Winnie Ewing was able to win over more Eurocritical colleagues in her party, while simultaneously highlighting the self-determination demands of Scotland through her reputation as 'Madame Ecosse' in the European Parliament (Lynch 1996) .. As such, both parties were to an extent Europeanised through their involvement in the European Parliament, which enabled them to bypass the UK state delegation and gain a direct political voice in Europe.
Finally, another striking similarity is that both parties initially sought to advance the cause of a 'Europe of the Regions', but ultimately had difficulties reconciling this discourse of a regionalised Europe with their core goals. This is because neither party wished to categorise their territory as merely a 'region' and therefore had difficulties in explaining how Scotland and Northern Ireland should fit into such a framework. By contrast, the SDLP has refrained from courting the more Eurosceptical attitude now apparent in both parts of Ireland, even when Sinn Féin has made gains from this.
Indeed, despite losing out to Sinn Féin in the last two European elections, the SDLP had continued to defend its pro-Europeanism (SDLP 2005; . In doing so, the party has demonstrated a deeper commitment to the project of supranational integration than the SNP, and for this reason, Mitchell and Cavanagh (2001: 262) suggest that the SDLP is perhaps more deserving of a 'post-nationalist' appellation. The case analysis suggests three explanations for this recent divergence in Celtic nationalist positioning on Europe. First, these differences were shaped by the parties' varying degrees of party unity on the issue of Europe, with the SDLP broadly united on the issue, and the SNP often more more divided. Party (dis)unity relates to a second factor which helps to explain differences between the two parties -the influence of particular leaders. For example, Hume, as a founding member of the SDLP, deputy leader for nine years, and then leader for a further 22, had an enormous impact on party policy.
This allowed him to imbue the SDLP with his own strongly pro-European ideals.
Meanwhile, in the SNP, while Alex Salmond sought to import a much more positive attitude to Europe into the party with the adoption of 'independence-in-Europe' in 1988, his Europhilia was far more practical, less vocal and less central to the SNP's selfunderstanding as a party compared to Hume's passionate support for Europe. As a result, the SNP leadership's historical ambivalence on European integration has allowed for greater debate within the party on European matters, and thus a much more pragmatic attitude towards the integrationist project. Finally, regional party competition had an important influence on party positioning on Europe. Since the early 1980s, the SDLP has faced an electoral rival, Sinn Féin, which has adopted a more nationalist, Eurosceptic position. This provided further grounds on which the SDLP might distinguish itself, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, when Hume could argue the economic benefits which his role as an MEP had brought to Northern Ireland. By contrast, the SNP has faced no significant (anti-European) nationalist competitor.
Conclusion
This article has explored how SNRPs in the 'Celtic periphery' of Scotland and Northern
Ireland have responded to deepening European integration. Whilst there is an extensive literature on the separate activities and strategies of the SDLP and SNP, the two parties have rarely been compared. Given the striking similarities in European approaches of the two parties, this is an oversight. Despite the different historical and political contexts from which these parties emerged, they have both sought to use Europe in similar ways.
Each has adopted comparable strategies in terms of their desire to obtain more structural funding; their coalition-building with like-minded parties at the European level; their use of the European Parliament to put Scottish/Northern Ireland interests on the map; and their desire to protect the local fishing and farming communities in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The two parties were at their most similar in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when both the SNP and SDLP were flirting with the idea of a regionalised Europe, but maintaining a certain ambiguity about their ultimate political objectives. Importantly, each party sought to use European integration to hasten their constitutional objectives of renegotiating relations with the UK state and engaging in new European alliances. As we have seen, during the period leading up to devolution in the 1990s, both the SNP and SDLP perceived Europe as a sphere in which they could advance their autonomy, and both parties sought to strengthen their voice at the European level, either through direct channels, or by obtaining more representation in UK delegations to Europe.
However, there have also been differences in each party's response to Europe, especially since the late 1990s. Whilst the SDLP continues to be very pro-Europeanwhich has proven an electoral disadvantage in today's political climate -the SNP has become more critical of certain aspects of the integrationist project -thus chiming with the public mood. This recent variation in Scottish and Northern Ireland nationalist responses to European integration may be explained by the extent of party unity on Europe, the influence of party leaders, and the challenges presented by nationalist or Euro-sceptical competitors. As such, the recent Celtic nationalist divisions on European integration demonstrate that, even for parties that have developed highly similar approaches towards European integration, one cannot speak of an 'homogenous' effect of Europe on SNRPs. Instead European integration has a differential impact -on different places and at different times -even for parties within the same state.
